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Who Bears Witness for the Witness? 
On the Testimony of  Literature
by
Gert-Jan van der Heiden (Radboud University Nijmegen)
Literature can be read in different ways and for different reasons. In his essay 
Demeure, which is concerned with Maurice Blanchot’s intriguing short 
story L’instant de ma mort, Derrida notes that this literary text can be read, 
as for instance historians might do, as an archive or a document; it can also 
be read as a symptom, or as a work of  literary fiction. Yet this enumeration 
starts with the possibility of  this work of  fiction being read “comme une 
témoignage dit sérieux et authentique”.1 This latter way of  reading, as the 
opening words of  Demeure indicate, determines the course of  Derrida’s 
considerations: “Fiction et témoignage”.2
By this specific orientation to testimony, Derrida inscribes his text De-
meure into a much wider range of  contemporary reflections on testimony, 
bearing witness and attestation – to Zeugnis, Zeugen and Bezeugung, as Ger-
man has it, immediately showing the intrinsic connection between these 
terms. A brief  list of  philosophical works in which testimony, bearing wit-
ness, and attestation appear as crucial concepts may easily convince us of  the 
importance of  these themes for contemporary thought: Heidegger’s Sein 
und Zeit, Lyotard’s Le différend, Foucault’s last lectures on parrhesia, Ricœur’s 
Soi-même comme un autre, Derrida’s reading of  Maurice Blanchot in Demeure 
as well as of  Paul Celan in Politique et poétique du témoignage, and Agamben’s 
Quel che resta di Auschwitz.
Although it is probably too much to ask for one, fixed common core in 
these different reflections on testimony, bearing witness, and attestation, it 
is possible to point out at least two main lines of  inquiry. First, these no-
tions are used to rethink the nature of  self-understanding, as Heidegger and 
Ricœur argue in their respective works. Second, these concepts are used to 
1 Jacques Derrida, Demeure. Maurice Blanchot, Paris 1998, p. 30.
2 Derrida, Demeure, p. 9.
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think what it means to be a witness and a survivor of  a dreadful event in 
history as Lyotard’s book as well as Agamben’s show. Although these two 
lines of  inquiry – self-understanding and survival in relation to the task of  
speaking for the other – are different, they nevertheless have many structural 
elements in common, and often they are inseparable. In this respect, Derri-
da’s Demeure deserves special attention since it shows us how these two lines 
of  inquiry are caught up in each other. Moreover, for a reflection on the 
theme of  philosophy as literature, Derrida’s text is significant since it addresses 
how the issue of  testimony is intrinsically related to fiction and literature.
In what follows, I will start with Heidegger’s notion of  Bezeugung (“at-
testation”) in order to discuss one way in which the problems of  testimony, 
bearing witness and attestation enter the stage of  contemporary thought. In 
addition, this allows me to address some of  the questions and concerns Der-
rida raises with respect to Heidegger on this issue. To deepen and interpret 
these concerns, I will turn to Derrida’s analysis of  testimony, its relation to 
fiction and, finally, explore one crucial motive at work in Derrida’s read-
ing of  Blanchot’s L’instant de ma mort as well as his reading of  Paul Celan’s 
phrase “Niemand/zeugt für den/Zeugen”.3 The question related to this 
phrase and that intrigues Derrida here – ‘Who bears witness for the (silent) 
witness?’ or ‘Who bears witness for the silence in witnessing?’ has a twofold 
importance, as I hope to show towards the end of  this essay: first, it goes to 
the heart of  Derrida’s concerns with respect to Heidegger; second, it offers 
an account of  speaking for the other in terms of  testimony; thus, it offers 
one of  the keys to understand why, according to Derrida, literature and 
fiction are indispensable in a philosophical reflection on testimony.
1. Departing from Heidegger
The fundamental role of  attestation (Bezeugung) in Sein und Zeit probably 
goes without saying. Attestation is the term Heidegger introduces to de-
scribe how Dasein calls itself  to authenticity, with “etwas wie eine fremde 
Stimme”4 that does not have any particular message to convey but still ad-
dresses Dasein in its everydayness. In attestation, Dasein bears witness to 
its authentic potentiality-of-being to itself. Heidegger uses the term attesta-
tion in order to stress that Dasein’s bearing witness is not about conveying 
knowledge or information; rather, it is performative in nature: By bearing 
3 Paul Celan, Aschenglorie, in: ibid., Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 2, ed. Beda Alle-
mann/Stefan Reichert/Rudolf  Büchner, Frankfurt am Main 1983, p. 72.
4 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 196711, p. 277.
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witness to itself, the possibility of  an authentic mode of  being is opened 
up for and made known to Dasein.5 Correspondingly, the response to such 
a call is not the affirmation or negation of  a certain proposition; rather, 
it places Dasein before a “choice” (Wahl) and asks of  Dasein a certain 
ethos or “attitude” (Haltung) which, if  Dasein indeed “wants-to-have-a-
conscience” (Gewissenhabenwollen) and wants to be-a-self, is characterized 
as “Entschlossenheit”.6
The relation of  attestation to making known and giving to understand 
immediately shows the hermeneutic nature of  attestation; this is affirmed by 
a beautiful quote from the essay “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung”, 
where Heidegger connects Bezeugung and Zeugen to Bekunden. Recall that 
he often looks for the basic meaning of  the term “hermeneutics” in a ter-
minology around Kunde, such as Kundgeben and Kunde bringen. Bekunden, or 
“to testify”, is part of  this family of  words. Heidegger writes:
Wer ist der Mensch? Jener, der zeugen muß, was er sei. Zeugen bedeutet einmal ein 
Bekunden; aber zugleich meint es: für das Bekundete in der Bekundung einstehen. Der 
Mensch ist der, der er ist, eben in der Bezeugung des eigenen Daseins. Diese Bezeugung 
meint hier nicht einen nachträglichen und beiherlaufenden Ausdruck des Menschen, 
sondern sie macht das Dasein des Menschen mit aus.7
The human being must bear witness to what he is. In fact, bearing witness 
or attestation of  his own existence is the very mode of  being of  humans. 
In this quote, Heidegger affirms that attestation is not concerned with epis-
temological problems, as if  our potentiality-of-being could be secured or 
guaranteed by a proof  or an argument. Rather, bearing witness and attesta-
tion themselves are the only guarantee that Dasein has of  its potentiality-of-
being. Therefore, Heidegger emphasizes in this quote how the act of  bear-
ing witness and attestation implies and requires a certain attitude, as is stated 
most clearly in the third sentence of  the quote: to bear witness also means to 
“be answerable for” (einstehen für) what one has testified. Hence, in attesta-
tion and bearing witness the Bekundung, the making known by testifying, 
cannot be separated from the Einstehen für, i. e., from the specific attitude 
by which the human himself  becomes answerable for and the guarantee of  
his own testimony. In this sense, by connecting Bekunden and Einstehen für, 
this quote repeats the basic gesture of  Sein und Zeit in which Bezeugung is 
the emphatic word Heidegger uses to articulate the inseparability of  mak-
5 Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 271: “ ‘Stimme’ ist aufgefasst als das Zu-Verstehen-
Geben.”
6 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 269–270.
7 Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zur Hölderlins Dichtung, Gesamtausgabe 4, 
Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 36.
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ing known or giving to understand and wanting-to-have-a-conscience, i. e., 
ultimately, the inseparability of  Erschlossenheit and Entschlossenheit.
If  we consider contemporary reflections on attestation, bearing witness 
and testimony, this double dimension of  “making known” and “being an-
swerable for …” often returns. Testimony is a form of  announcement that 
engages the speaker in a specific way: in addition to the testimony’s specific 
content, the witness always also says, implicitly or explicitly, “I will answer 
for what I said; I will vouch for it.”
Nevertheless, although Heidegger’s conception of  Bezeugung may have 
set the agenda, concerns can be raised with respect to his analysis. There-
fore, let me conclude this brief  discussion of  Bezeugung with two remarks 
preparing my discussion of  Derrida’s Demeure.
(1) The first remark concerns the status of  the text or the language by 
which Heidegger addresses the issue of  Bezeugung. Neither his reflections in 
Sein und Zeit nor his comments in “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung” 
are themselves attestations in the pertinent sense of  Bezeugung. Neverthe-
less, as Derrida suggests, one might argue that this text itself  does have the 
structure of  a testimony or of  bearing witness. Not only does it disclose and 
announce the structure of  attestation at the heart of  Dasein’s being, but it 
also seems to present this structure as a testimony that cannot be reduced 
to external arguments, proofs or principles; and, instead, it offers itself  as its 
own guarantee. As Derrida puts it:
Le Dasein doit pouvoir témoigner de lui-même, voilà, dans Sein und Zeit, l’axiome ou le 
témoignage de l’analytique existentiale du Dasein. Dès le début, Heidegger annonce la 
mise en lumière, la monstration, la présentation (Aufweis) phénoménologique d’un tel té-
moignage (der phänomenologische Aufweis einer solcher Bezeugung), à savoir la phénoménolo-
gie d’une expérience qui est elle-même phénoménologique, c’est-à-dire consistant en une 
présentation. C’est la présentation d’une présentation, le témoignage sur un témoignage : il 
y a là du témoin pour le témoin, du témoignage pour le témoignage.8
What intrigues me in this comment is the transition from presentation to 
testimony  – a transition that is passed over by Derrida without any com-
ment and that is also reflected in the conjunction of  axiom and testimony at 
the beginning of  the quote. To see how odd this latter conjunction is, recall 
that a testimony has the speaker who utters it as its “proof” or guarantee; 
hence a testimony is not clear out of  itself; an axiom, on the other hand, is 
that which is clear and evident out of  itself. The reference to presentation 
may be read in light of  Derrida’s reservation with respect to all phenom-
enology as a thought privileging presentation and the present. Moreover, 
the parallel he draws between the presentation of  presentation and the tes-
8 Jacques Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, in: Herne 83 (2004), 
pp. 521–539, here p. 530.
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timony of  testimony, suggests that the first is as problematic as the second. 
Indeed, this suggestion is corroborated by the following sentence in which 
he writes “il y a là du témoin pour le témoin”. One needs to be aware that 
this sentence appears in an essay in which Paul Celan’s phrase “Niemand/
zeugt für den/Zeugen” guides the whole rhythm of  the text.9
Yet, if  we read Derrida’s comment in this way, by emphasizing the analo-
gous status of  presentation and testimony and by reading testimony in light 
of  a certain primacy of  presentation in phenomenology – a reading which 
is, let us not forget, invited by Derrida’s text – we deprive ourselves of  an-
other reading, namely a reading in which testimony is not subsumed under 
or considered as an analogy of  presentation, but rather a reading in which 
attestation (as well as the testimony of  the text itself) is a moment in which 
Heidegger himself  problematizes or displaces the value and meaning of  
phenomenology and presentation. I think this latter reading is more in line 
with what we saw earlier in our own discussion of  Heidegger’s text, namely 
that attestation is not only about disclosure but connects disclosure to the 
problem of  the witness who becomes answerable for his or her testimony 
and who becomes him or herself  the guarantee of  this testimony.
(2) These latter considerations bring me to a second remark. The ten-
dency in Derrida’s quote to equate testimony and presentation in Hei-
degger’s text goes hand in hand with a continual rethinking of  testimony 
and attestation in which he exactly addresses the nature and the intrinsic 
difficulty of  the type of  guarantee implied in bearing witness and, more 
precisely, the specific uncertainty of  this type of  guarantee. To try to cap-
ture this under one heading and to relate it immediately to Derrida’s other 
readings of  Heidegger, note that although Heidegger addresses the specific 
attitude of  Einstehen für and Entschlossenheit in his account of  attestation, he 
does not discuss another typical aspect of  every testimony and all bearing 
witness. A witness is only accepted as such if  he or she is considered to be 
trustworthy. Any witness, as Derrida often emphasizes, always appeals to 
the trust of  the addressee: whatever the witness says, he or she also, albeit 
perhaps implicitly, says: “Believe me and believe that what I say is true!” 
Heidegger neglects this particular dimension of  belief, faith and trust, as 
Derrida argues.10
I hope that my previous comments indicate how I assess this critique of  
Derrida. On the one hand, Derrida might be too quick in drawing a par-
allel between presentation and testimony. In fact, Heidegger’s attention to 
 9 In particular, it is mentioned immediately after the quotation above, cf. Derrida, 
Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 530.
10 Cf., e. g., Jacques Derrida, Foi et savoir, Points, Paris 2001, pp. 90–91; and 
Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 532.
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the necessity of  the human to be answerable for his or her testimony brings 
him quite close to the problematic of  faith, belief, and trustworthiness: 
the witness is him or herself  the only guarantee of  what is said – and one 
would be tempted to supplement Heidegger’s explicit comments immedi-
ately with the remark that this guarantee that the witness him or herself  is, 
indeed depends on nothing else than the trustworthiness of  the testimony 
for which the witness has to answer. Yet, on the other hand, Derrida is 
right that Heidegger does not seem to offer such a supplement – at least 
not explicitly. There might be different reasons for this.11 Yet, to phrase this 
in terms of  Derrida’s concerns, as long as it is taken for granted – as an axiom 
or as a testimony – that attestation is possible, that is to say, as long as there is a 
witness for the witness, and “a testimony for or about a testimony”, and as long 
as this witness and testimony are taken for granted, the question of  trust, 
belief  and faith will not enter the picture. However, what if  this witness for 
the witness is not believed? What if  we take the possibility seriously that this 
witness for the witness is offering a false testimony? Or, what if  attestation 
is impossible? Is it possible to testify to or for such an impossibility? These 
questions, as I will show in the second part of  my paper, guide Derrida’s 
reflections on testimony; therefore, let us turn to Derrida’s systematic reflec-
tion on testimony in his text Demeure.
2. Derrida and the Double Bind of  Fiction and Testimony
I will address Demeure along three lines: (a) First, an exposition of  Derrida’s 
account of  testimony in light of  the problem of  trust and belief. (b) Second, 
a discussion of  how this problematic relates testimony to literature. (c) Third, 
re-examine this problematic in light of  the question of  who bears witness for 
the witness and there I will turn to L’instant de ma mort, the text by Blanchot 
that orients Derrida’s Demeure.
(a) The Aporias of  Testimony. As in his discussion of  other phenomena, 
Derrida is very attentive to the systematic aporia or tension that exists be-
tween the singularity and uniqueness presupposed in every testimony, on 
11 For instance, one might consider the fact that the attestation of  Dasein is not only 
addressed to Dasein, but also given by Dasein, so the crucial difference between the wit-
ness and the addressee on which Derrida insists seems to dissolve in Heidegger’s version 
of  attestation. Nevertheless, Heidegger does mention that Dasein, the listener, is Dasein 
in its everyday existence and that the call of  conscience, calling Dasein to an authentic 
existence is “etwas wie eine fremde Stimme”. “Yet, on exactly on ein on weg? this point, 
one may wonder why the problem of  belief  and trust is not addressed. If  it is indeed an 
alien voice, why would or should Dasein in its everyday existence trust this voice?
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the one hand, and the repetition, generality or universality, on the other 
hand. Let us say, to prepare what will follow later, that testimony is located 
at the point of  intersection of  what is unshareable and what can be shared. 
On the one hand, the witness is singular because he witnessed an event to 
which others – and in particular the ones who need his testimony – were 
not present. To experience or to be present at a certain event makes the 
witness unique and irreplaceable. As Derrida notes, already playing with the 
idea of  ‘the witness for the witness’ the addressee might be called a witness 
of  the witness since the addressee is the one who witnesses how the first 
witness bears witness. However, as Derrida writes: “Ce non-accès direct 
ou immédiat du destinataire à l’objet du témoignage, c’est ce qui marque 
l’absence de ce ‘témoin du témoin’ à la chose même.”12 In this sense, the 
addressees depend on the witness’s testimony to have access to the event. 
Therefore, testimony is indispensable and irreducible to proof. On the other 
hand, bearing witness means to make this private experience public. Thus, 
bearing witness also implies repetition and generality in a number of  senses. 
Let me mention only two of  these senses. First, the witness presupposes and 
trusts that he shares a language with the addressees so that they can indeed 
understand his testimony and that he can give to understand his testimony 
to them.13 Second, at the moment of  bearing witness and making his ex-
periences public, the witness is no longer present at the event of  which he 
testifies. As Derrida puts it in his typical idiom:
Il n’est plus présent, maintenant, à ce à quoi il dit avoir été présent, à ce qu’il dit avoir 
perçu; même s’il dit être présent, présentement présent, ici maintenant, parce qu’on ap-
pelle la mémoire, la mémoire articulée à un langage, à son avoir-été présent.14
This manifold double bind of  singularity and repetition has important 
consequences. Because the addressee is always excluded from any direct ac-
cess to the event, the witness can never prove his testimony. Due to this lack 
of  a rigorous proof, or perhaps I should say “as a counterpart of  this lack 
of  rigorous proof”, the witness himself  becomes answerable for the truth 
of  his testimony, as we already saw in our discussion of  Heidegger. This 
particular characteristic of  testimony involves at least the following three 
closely connected elements.
First, to be a guarantor for a testimony implies that, although the witness 
bears witness here and now, in the present, he commits himself  to repeat this 
testimony in the future and to hold on to it. As Derrida writes: “Quand je 
m’engage à dire la vérité, je m’engage à répéter la même chose, un instant 
12 Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 527.
13 Cf. Derrida, Demeure, pp. 37–39.
14 Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 528.
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après, deux instants après, le lendemain et pour l’éternité, d’une certaine 
manière.”15
Second, a testimony is a performative event in which the witness puts 
himself  at stake. Of course, a testimony usually has a certain content; yet, 
bearing witness “ne se réduit pas essentiellement [ ] à une relation narrative 
ou descriptive”.16 To show this as emphatically as possible, Derrida refers to 
the example of  martyrdom in which the witness puts his own life at stake 
for his testimony:
Le martyr, quand il témoigne, il ne raconte pas d’histoire, il s’offre. Il témoigne de sa foi en 
s’offrant ou en offrant sa vie ou son corps, et cet acte de témoignage n’est pas seulement 
un engagement, mais sa passion ne renvoie à rien d’autre qu’à son moment présent.17
Third, as Derrida writes, “le témoignage prétend toujours témoigner en 
vérité de la vérité, pour la vérité”.18 The witness presents himself  as being 
engaged in telling the truth. Aside from the particular content of  the testi-
mony, the witness also makes a particular appeal addressed to the listeners, 
namely, “vous devez me croire, parce que je m’engage à vous dire la vérité”.19 
The addressee is asked to believe and, in turn, the witness has to appear 
as trustworthy to the addressee. This act of  belief  is necessary because the 
witness’s claim to truth is without proof. Derrida insists on the distinction 
between testimony and scientific forms of  knowing and the demonstration 
that the latter involves.20 He insists on this difference because in the case of  
a demonstration, the listener has their own access to the demonstration – he 
or she has access to exactly the same lines of  argument and the same material 
as the mathematician or the physicist – whereas in the case of  testimony, the 
testified event or occurrence is not accessible to the addressees.
The first two elements I mentioned are also concerned with this third 
element since they may contribute to the trustworthiness of  a witness: 
somebody who is not capable of  holding on to his testimony will quickly 
appear as a witness who does not deserve to be believed, and somebody who 
is willing to put his life at stake for his testimony will appear as somebody 
who is steadfast and resolute in his convictions.
(b) The Appeal to Believe and Literature. Due to testimony’s claim to truth, 
testimony requires the exclusion of  any contamination by fiction, as Der-
rida argues in Demeure:
15 Derrida, Demeure, pp. 36–37.
16 Derrida, Demeure, p. 44.
17 Derrida, Demeure, p. 44.
18 Derrida, Demeure, p. 28.
19 Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 527. (Derrida, SiQ, 76.) Was ist 
das?
20 Cf. Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage, p. 528.
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Dans notre tradition juridique européenne, un témoignage devrait rester étranger à la 
littérature et surtout, dans la littérature, à ce qui se donne comme fiction, simulation ou 
simulacre, et qui n’est pas toute la littérature. Un témoin témoignante [ ], il fait appel à 
la foi de l’autre en s’engageant à dire la vérité, aucun juge n’acceptera qu’il se décharge 
ironiquement de sa responsabilité en déclarant ou insinuant : ce que je vous dis là garde 
le statut d’une fiction littéraire.21
Although this prohibition does not seem to leave any room for literature and 
fiction in testimony, this prohibition is a symptom of  an underlying possibil-
ity. Every testimony appeals to an act of  faith and a basic trust in two ways, 
as I noted before. On the part of  the listeners, of  the tribunal of  judges and 
jury members, testimony asks for an act of  faith to trust and believe the one 
who bears witness; but it also requires a basic trust and belief  on the part 
of  the witness that the tribunal is capable of  understanding the testimony. 
(Lyotard’s Le différend is important because it problematizes and questions 
exactly this latter trust and belief.) This dependence on belief, trust and faith 
in testimony means also that no testimony can exclude the specter of  false 
testimony or fiction. As Derrida writes:
Il n’est pas de témoignage qui n’implique structurellement en lui-même la possibilité de 
la fiction, du simulacre, de la dissimulation, du mensonge et du parjure – c’est-à-dire aussi 
de la littérature, de l’innocente ou perverse littérature qui joue innocemment à pervertir 
toutes ces distinctions. Si cette possibilité qu’il semble interdire était effectivement exclue, 
si le témoignage, dès lors, devenait preuve, information, certitude ou archive, il perdrait 
sa fonction de témoignage.22
Derrida continues this account in his own characteristic way and there we 
find some of  the typical figures of  thought that he uses throughout his 
(later) work, such as haunting, the undecidable, the parasite and the chance 
that is only given as a risk; he writes:
Pour rester témoignage, il doit donc se laisser hanter. Il doit se laisser parasiter par cela 
même qu’il exclut de son for intérieur, la possibilité, au moins, de la littérature. C’est sur 
cette limite indécidable que nous allons essayer de demeurer. Cette limite est une chance 
et une menace, la ressource à la fois du témoignage et de la fiction littéraire […].23
Here we get a first answer to the question of  why Derrida, especially in his 
later readings of  Heidegger, often comes back to Heidegger’s tendency to 
forget to think how notions such as faith, trust and belief  affect his thought 
and, in particular, his understanding of  attestation. By exploring the neces-
sary appeal to belief  and trust in every testimony, Derrida shows that the 
question “Is this testimony fiction, yes or no?” must remain unanswerable 
and undecidable in order for testimony to exist. This undecidability of  
21 Derrida, Demeure, pp. 30–31.
22 Derrida, Demeure, p. 31.
23 Derrida, Demeure, p. 31.
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testimony threatens its claim to truth. Yet, as Derrida argues, there may be 
testimony, but only at the unavoidable and impassable risk of  it being fiction 
or literature. The possibility or the chance of  testimony is only given with 
the threat of  literature and fiction.
(c) Who Bears Witness for the Witness? These considerations show, to put 
it in Derrida’s own words, that testimony has a secret that needs to be kept 
secret in testimony. What needs to be kept secret in testimony is that the 
testimony might also be a fiction – that the witness is a false witness, that 
the witness’s imagination has altered his memories involuntarily, that the 
witness has no longer access to what he witnessed. No witness who testifies 
to this possibility  – and during his testimony adds a doubt to his “I know” 
by wondering “do I know it?”  – will ever be taken seriously at witness. 
In a moment, we will see this problem return in Blanchot’s L’instant de ma 
mort, the text on which Demeure is centered.
Let me indicate first which determination of  the secret our previous 
analyses provide. The secret is that about which a testimony has to keep 
silent because it cannot say it. A secret is that which cannot be shared. As 
always when Derrida discusses faith, trust, and belief, these notions appear 
when we confront something that cannot be shared. In the case of  testi-
mony, this unshareable is concentrated in the uniqueness and irreplaceability 
of  the witness’s experience of  an event. Although bearing witness is a way 
of  making public, this uniqueness indicates that something in testimony 
remains unshareable and asks for trust and belief.
It is in relation to this dimension of  the secret and the unshareable that 
literature offers a specific opportunity. Literature, according to Derrida, is 
not only a threat to testimony, it is also that which can bear witness to this 
secret, to that which remains silent in every testimony and what remains un-
shared in every making public of  testimony proper. At precisely this point, 
Blanchot’s L’instant de ma mort offers us an exemplary instance.
L’instant de ma mort is a fiction that presents itself  as testimony.24 In this 
short story, the author introduces a narrator who reports about an event that 
happened to a young man years ago: during the war, this young man was 
placed in front of  a firing squad to be executed. However, at the moment 
he is about to be shot, the lieutenant is called away and the commander of  
the firing squad offers the young man an escape. In this story, the narrator 
tries to capture what this event meant for the young man. This young man, 
as story tells, experienced the moment of  his own death but nevertheless 
24 Cf. Derrida, Demeure, p. 92: “La littérature sert de témoignage réel. La littérature 
affecte, par une surcroît de fiction, d’autres diraient de mensonge, de passer pour un té-
moignage réel et responsible sur la réalité historique – sans pourtant le signer puisque c’est 
de la littérature et que le narrateur n’est pas l’auteur d’une autobiographie.”
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survived it. When the story unfolds, it becomes clear that the narrator, al-
though at first he depicts the young man as someone else, is the same man as 
the narrator; or more precisely, he is not the same man since he is separated 
from his younger self  by this event in which the young man died and which 
the narrator survived. In this sense, the narrator is a witness of  what hap-
pened to the young man, but at the same time an impossible witness because 
he has no longer access to what the young man experienced. These two I’s 
that appear in the story are accompanied by a third I, as Derrida suggests, 
namely by Blanchot the author who experienced a similar event in June 
1944.25 He offers a testimony of  this event, but he does so in the form of  
a fiction of  testimony.
Thus, as Derrida suggests in Demeure, Blanchot bears witness to the im-
possibility of  self-attestation when events occur in a life that so fundamen-
tally change who one is that one no longer has access to one’s younger self. 
The narrator is the survivor; the young man died. At moments, the story 
hints at the intrinsic problem of  such a witness for the witness. Although 
the narrator begins his story with the words “Je me souviens d’un jeune 
homme”,26 this remembering is of  a dubious nature and involves forgetting 
and doubt as well as imagination. At first, the strong beginning of  “je me 
souviens” (“I remember”) seems to be repeated in an even stronger way 
when the narrator says “je sais” (“I know”) when describing the feelings 
of  the young man and the impact the event had on him. However, this “je 
sais”, which occurs at least twice in the story, is immediately duplicated. 
The first time, it is accompanied by doubt: “le sais-je” (“do I know it”); the 
second time it is counteracted by fiction – “je sais, j’imagine” (“I know, I 
imagine”), the narrator says.27 This doubling in knowing and doubting as 
well as in knowing and imagining reflects the doubling of  the young man 
and the narrator as well as the doubling of  voices in story: when the first 
voice says “Je suis vivant”, the second immediately responds: “Non, tu es 
mort.”
These doublings mark the narrator as the witness who survives the event 
of  the young man’s death and these doublings complicate the possibility of  
a testimony, to quote Derrida, “dans lequel le témoin jure de dire la vérité, 
toute la vérité, rien que la vérité”.28 After all, how to trust the testimony 
of  a witness who, at the moment of  bearing witness, says “do I know it?” 
25 Cf. Derrida, Demeure, p. 93.
26 Maurice Blanchot, L’instant de ma mort, in: Maurice Blanchot and Jacques 
Derrida, The Instant of  my Death/Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Stanford 2000, 
pp. 2–11, here p. 2.
27 Blanchot, L’instant de ma mort, p. 4, p. 8.
28 Derrida, Demeure, pp. 93–94.
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or “I imagine”. In this sense, as Derrida is keen to point out, this fictional 
testimony bears witness to the fact that, in these cases, testimony and 
bearing witness in the strict sense of  the word are impossible. This aligns 
with Blanchot’s concerns elsewhere. As Derrida notes, Blanchot has been 
very attentive to the “possibilité critique [ ] de témoigner de l’absence 
d’attestation, quand nous ressentons le devoir d’attester auprès de l’autre 
que l’attestation n’est pas possible”.29 Exactly in this possibility of  bearing 
witness to the absence of  attestation, as Derrida indicates, Blanchot comes 
very close to the problem to which Celan’s phrase “Niemand/zeugt für 
den/Zeugen” hints.30
L’instant de ma mort shows what the testimony of  literature might be, as 
we can see when we ask: who is the witness in this story? Strictly speaking, 
the young man is the real witness of  the event. Although the narrator is the 
same man, the story attests to the impossibility of  the narrator taking the 
place of  the young man as a witness, even though he is the same person. 
The phrase “I know – do I know it” implies exactly this: the narrator can 
no longer take the place of  the proper or the real witness. At the same time, 
as Derrida writes: “il témoigne pour un témoin, en un sens différent cette 
fois, à la place du témoin qu’il ne peut pas être pour cet autre témoin que 
fut le jeune homme, et pourtant lui-même.”31 We find here a testimony 
that attests to the silence of  the young man and testifies, in this sense, for 
the absence of  attestation. This is no longer a proper testimony because it 
testifies to the impossibility of  attestation in these circumstances – “do I 
know it”, “I imagine”.
3. Concluding Remarks
In the beginning of  this essay, I suggested, first, that an exploration of  the 
question “Who bears witness for the witness?” goes to the heart of  Der-
rida’s concerns with respect to Heidegger’s concept of  attestation and, 
second, that it offers an account of  speaking for the other in terms of  tes-
timony. Let me conclude by showing where we stand with respect to these 
two suggestions.
First, behind the question of  who bears witness for the witness, we in-
deed see a struggle with Heidegger concerning the impossibility of  attesta-
tion. This contrast is confirmed by the figure, which Blanchot introduces 
29 Derrida, Demeure, p. 33.
30 Cf. Derrida, Demeure, p. 34.
31 Derrida, Demeure, p. 84.
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in L’instant de ma mort: in opposition to Heidegger’s account of  attestation, 
which is also concerned with thinking the imminence of  death, Blanchot 
portrays a man who survived his own death. Rather than a “giving to un-
derstand” (“Zu-Verstehen-geben”) by the call of  a silent voice that offers 
Dasein a possibility-for-being-a-whole, death is conceived here as an event 
that breaks life in two – the young man and what remains of  him in the 
figure of  the narrator. Rather than giving something to understand, the 
narrator bears witness to what remains when the moment of  the voice and 
of  giving to understand is suspended.
Second, and to explicate the previous sentence, if  we describe the se-
cret of  testimony in terms of  a silence at the heart of  every witness and 
in terms of  what remains unshareable, we see what Blanchot’s story offers 
us. In L’instant de ma mort, the young man is the real witness, but he is also 
doomed to silence. What remains of  him after his death is the narrator who 
survived. The narrator can still speak and give to understand, and he is 
closely related to the young man although he does not coincide with him. 
Thus, the narrator is portrayed as the one who bears witness for the real 
witness; he speaks for him who cannot speak; in this sense, he testifies for 
the absence of  attestation. Such a testimony is always fictional, but not in 
the pejorative sense of  this word; rather, in the sense of  the narrator trying 
to voice the experiences of  the young man – “I know – do I know it”. It 
is here, perhaps, also that the issue of  trust and belief  appears in yet another 
form at the heart of  testimony. Here, it is not only a question of  whether 
the reader believes the narrator or whether the narrator trusts that we, the 
readers, can understand him, but it is also a question of  whether the narrator 
believes and trusts himself  in his own bearing witness because he is aware 
of  the distance separating him from the real witness; he does not share fully 
in the experiences of  the real witness; after all, he is what remains of  the 
real witness. Perhaps this is also why L’instant de ma mort is capable in an 
exemplary fashion of  testifying to the struggle that is kept silent in every 
normal testimony, since it threatens testimony’s claim to truth: L’instant de 
ma mort testifies to the struggle between belief  and disbelief, between trust 
and distrust, between testimony and fiction, when the narrator says “I know, 
I imagine”.
Together with Lyotard’s Le différend and Agamben’s Quel che resta di 
 Auschwitz, Derrida addresses the theme of  testimony in light of  the question 
of  who bears witness for those witnesses who lost their ability to speak or 
are not capable of  making their voice heard.32 In these analyses, we reach 
the limit of  the concept of  testimony and we are on the brink of  what is 
32 Cf. Derrida, Demeure, pp. 33–34.
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kept silent and what remains unshareable. Exactly here, by reading Blanchot 
in close connection with Celan’s “Niemand/zeugt für den/Zeugen”, Der-
rida’s Demeure shows the power of  literature and poetry to testify for the 
absence of  attestation and to bear witness for those witnesses who remain 
silent.
Summary
This essay explores the role of  fiction in testimonial literature. More in particular, it ex-
amines how testimonial literature can be understood as bearing witness for the absence of  
testimony. It does so by first discussing the concepts of  testimony, attestation and witness 
in the work of  Heidegger. Subsequently, by bringing Derrida’s critique of  Heidegger into 
play, this essay shows how Derrida thinks these concepts and how he assesses the prob-
lematic and complicated relation between testimony and literature. This relation forms 
the basis for Derrida’s reading of  Blanchot’s L’instant de ma mort. In this latter text, fiction 
and literature give shape to the possibility of  attesting to the impossibility of  testimony.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Essay untersucht die Rolle der Fiktion in der Zeugnisliteratur und, genauer, wie die 
Zeugnisliteratur als ein Zeuge für die Abwesenheit eines Zeugnisses verstanden werden 
kann. Erstens werden die Begriffe „Zeugnis“, „Bezeugung“ und „Zeuge“ im Werk 
Heideggers besprochen. Zweitens bringt dieses Essay Derridas Kritik an Heidegger ins 
Spiel und zeigt, wie Derrida diese Begriffe sowie das problematische und komplizierten 
Verhältnisse zwischen Zeugnis und Literatur versteht. Dieses Verhältnis motiviert Derridas 
Lektüre von Blanchots L’instant de ma mort. In diesem letzten Text gestalten Fiktion und 
Literatur die Möglichkeit, die Unmöglichkeit des Zeugnisses zu bezeugen. 
